It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.
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"The question whether a treaty is self-executing is a matter of interpretation for the courts when the issue presents itself in litigation." '3 The difficulty :of this enquiry is well-illustrated by United States v. Postal, where the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas was not selfexecuting:
Article 6 declares the exclusivity of a nation's jurisdiction over the vessels entitled to fly its flag: "Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas." On its face, this language would bear a self-executing construction because it purports to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by foreign states in the absence of an exception embodied in treaty. We are admonished, however, to interpret treaties in the context of their promulgation, and we think the context of article 6 compels the conclusion that it is not self-executing. 4 The Court reached this conclusion by first recognizing the "lack of mutuality between the United States and countries that do not recognize treaties as self-executing. '5 It then reviewed continuing U.S. practice asserting "limited jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas, generally but not always within the twelve-mile limit, to enforce a variety of interests not expressly authorized in treaties." '6 Finally, it concluded that it was not "the intent of the United States to so limit the operation of its statutes" because of the legislative history of the convention. 7 That such a determination that an international maritime convention or its provision is or is not self-executing may be a matter of considerable judicial discretion is demonstrated by the criticism lev-elled at the Postal holding. 8 The First Circuit has even gone so far as to hold that Article 6 of the High Seas Convention is part of customary international law and so therefore part of U.S. law.
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The international conventions relating to the rules of the road on the high seas have been likewise promulgated by statute in the United States, it being more or less assumed that "practically identical Rules have been enacted by the other maritime nations."" Similarly, the United States has passed legislation fulfilling many of its obligations under international maritime conventions relating to shipping, e.g., the regulation of pilots, load lines, qualifications and wages of officers and crews of vessels, carriage of dangerous goods, and ocean dumping.
12 A very useful survey of the statutory implementation of international maritime conventions in the United States is to be found in a recent study by the Maritime Law Association of the United States.' 3 When an international maritime convention is held to be selfexecuting or when the courts have decided that the intent of Congress or the President has been to comply with international law, the U.S. courts may turn to international practice and opinion to interpret these international obligations of the United States. The best-known expression of this principle appeared in a maritime case, albeit one involving the customary law of the sea. In the Paquete Habana, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Navy's seizure of two Cuban fishing vessels captured during the Spanish-American War.' 4 Recording the proclamations of President McKinley to conduct the war "upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations and sanctioned by their recent practice" and to maintain a blockade of Cuba "in pursuance of... the law of nations,' (1) An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
(2) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the agreement, and subsequent practice between the parties in the application of the agreement, are to be taken into account in its interpretation.
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In the United States, many courts strive to give treaties the same interpretation they would have before an international court. However, there is sometimes a greater willingness shown in the United States than internationally to interpret a treaty by ascertaining the meaning intended by the parties rather than by strictly reading the text. A U.S. court or agency may well use interpretative materials supplementary to those relied on by an international court such as Congressional reports and debates and other internal documentation relating to the negotiation or ratification of an international agreement. Although courts in the United States have the competence to finally interpret treaties for domestic law purposes, great judicial deference is usually paid to the Executive Branch, which "has authority to determine the interpretation of an international agreement to be asserted by the United States in its relations with other states. For example, in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, the Supreme Court decided to follow the interpretation of a treaty as it was made by both the U.S. and Japanese governments and held that "[a]lthough not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight. '23 In interpreting international conventions, the U.S. courts look both at the explicit terms of the treaty and at the intent of the parties: "The clearw import of treaty language controls unless 'application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories.'-"24 The rule relating to the role of the courts was plainly set forth in 1821 in an opinion by Justice Story of the Supreme Court:
[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether small or great, important or trivial,, would be, on our part, an usurpation of power, and not an exercise of judicial functions. It would be to make, and not to construe a treaty. Neither can this Court, supply a casus omissus in a treaty, any more than in a law. We are to find out the intention of the parties, by just rules of interpretation, applied to the subject matter; and having found that, our duty is to follow it, so far as it goes, and to stop where that stops -whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties which it leaves behind.
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This interpretative reliance applies not only when the treaty itself is before the Court, but also when the treaty is used to help interpret an implementing statute of Congress. So, for example, in interpreting tht Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, Justice Whittaker of the Supreme Court noted:
The legislative history of the Act shows that it was lifted almost bodily from the No. 5639. The Convention provides that the sovereignty of a state extends to "internal waters." Art. 1. The Convention also contains a set of rules delimiting those waters... Of importance to this case, the Convention also includes as a state's "internal waters" those waters enclosed in "bays" as defined in Article 7. Most of the rules in this Article identify the criteria for defining "juridical bays," but Article 7(6) further includes as "bays" "so-called 'historic' bays"
29
Massachusetts relied on the Convention's "historic bay" provision to argue that Nantucket Sound was within its internal waters. However, the Convention nowhere defined "historic bay." 30 In defining "historic bay" and deciding against Massachusetts, the Court first turned to a United Nations study. 3 ' The judgment then looked to maritime practice in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as reported in treatises by Brownlie and Blum, 32 to the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Case, 33 to an Indian decision, 3 4 and finally to claims based on the exploitation of marine resources by, e.g., Australia, Mexico, Columbia, and Algeria. 35 These evidences demonstrated that for Massachusetts' claim to succeed, the state needed to demonstrate an "effective occupation" of the historic bay "perfected no later than the latter half of 27. Janis, supra note 1, at 83-87. 
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[Vol. 38 could readily have done so itself. It is our opinion that we best fill our responsibility of giving content to the words which Congress employed by adopting the best and most workable definitions available. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, approved by the Senate and ratified by the President, provides such definitions. This establishes a single coastline for both the administration of the Submerged Lands Act and the conduct of our future international relations (barring an unexpected change in the rules, established by the Convention). Furthermore the comprehensiveness of the Convention provides answers to many of the lesser problems related to coastlines which, absent the convention, would be most troublesome.
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One of the recurrent problems involving interpretation of international maritime conventions in the United States is fixing the relationship between these obligations and U.S. municipal law. Article VI(2) of the Constitution makes both treaties and Federal law "the supreme Law of the Land" but does not give one or the other priority. The U.S. courts will in the first place attempt to reconcile apparently conflicting laws and treaty rules: "[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains. '47 If this is not possible then the provision later-in-time controls:
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing. Mazel Tov, some eleven-and-a-half miles and more than one hour from the coast of Massachusetts and discovered unmanifested liquor. The vessel was brought to Providence and a penalty assessed for not manifesting the liquor; the Mazel Toy was seized. Cook, the master and bailee of the boat, argued that it had been arrested outside the jurisdiction of the United States.5° The 1924 Treaty, inter alia, limited U.S. search-and-seizure rights over British vessels to distances no more "than can be traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected of endeavoring to commit the offense." 5 1 Although the 1922 Act permitted seizures up to twelve miles off the U.S. coast, 5 2 the court, in an opinion by Justice Brandeis, ruled:
The Treaty, being later in date than the Act of 1922, superseded, so far as inconsistent with the terms of the Act, the authority which had been conferred by § 581 upon officers of the Coast Guard to board, search and seize beyond our territorial waters ... For in a strict sense the Treaty was self-executing, in that no legislation was necessary to authorize executive action pursuant to its provisions. However, the later-in-time rule does not apply to conflicts between international maritime conventions and state law. The Constitution's Supremacy Clause has been uniformally held to preempt state statutes of no matter what date. 5 9 Interestingly, the supremacy of international agreements over state law even extends to agreements not submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent under Article II of the Constitution. As Justice Sutherland held for the Supreme Court in 1937:
A treaty signifies "a compact made between two or more independent nations with a view to the public welfare." Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600. But an international compact, as this was, is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate. There are many such compacts, of which a protocol, a modus vivendi, a postal convention, and agreements like that now under consideration are illustrations ....
Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies. The supremacy of a treaty in this respect has been recognized from the beginning. Mr. Madison, in the Virginia Convention, said that if a treaty does not supersede existing state laws, as far as they contravene its operation, the treaty would be ineffective. "To counteract it by the supremacy of the state laws, would bring on the Union the just charge of national perfidy, and involve us in war."... In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear." 60 The U.S. courts will also apply and interpret international maritime conventions when ordinary choice of law principles indicate that foreign law should apply to the transaction and that foreign law incorporates an international agreement. So, in Alkmeon Naviera, Furthermore, one treaty may be used to interpret another. So, for example, the multilateral convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, inter alia, was employed by the Second Circuit in United States v. Quemener to interpret a bilateral agreement between the United States and Great Britain. 63 The bilateral treaty permitted the 'United States to interdict vessels within 150 miles of the United States and the question was whether that distance was to be measured only from the mainland or also from islands. The Second Circuit turned to U.S. case law, 64 publicists such as Wheaton and Jessup, 65 and U.S. and British diplomatic practice,6 to support the rule of measuring from islands. Finally, this position is supported by reference to a number of international treaties. Most significant, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which appellants point to as providing the source for a definition of "coastline," specifically confirms that islands possess independent coasts or coastlines ... ("1. An island is a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high-tide. 2. The Territorial Sea of an island is measured in accordance with these articles.") 67 Finally, U.S. courts have interpreted international maritime conventions to discover customary international law. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Williams refused to directly apply the Convention on the High Seas to the facts of the case because Panama, the flag state of a boarded vessel, was not a party to the Convention. 68 But, noting that the High Seas Convention was "a codification of international law," and that Panama had consented to the boarding:
We do not think that the Convention was meant to protect the privacy of those on board but rather the Treaty is a means to protect the national interest implicit in freedom of
